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RECOVERING THE HIDDEN 
THROUGH FOUND-FOOTAGE FILMS 
Dirk de Bruyn 
In the early 1970s materialist experimental fi.lm was cogently rejected by feminist 
theorists for its inability to deliver a feminist counter-cinema addressing its politi-
cal agenda. The concomitant development of feminist psychoanalytic readings of 
"dominant cinema" against its grain also discounted such work. This split is marked 
by Peter Wollen's formulation of "two avant-gardes", one narrative and explicit 
about its political position and the other non-narrative and focusing directly on im-
plicit perceptual processes. Materialist film's fixation on structure jettisoned content, 
and extended post-war painting's essentialist move to pure abstraction manifest in 
abstract expressionism and minimalism. The emergence of trauma theory and the 
recent explosion of moving image digital media with its non-linear bias and the 
complex layering of "technical images" have created a new situation opening up 
alternate readings of such discounted materialist practices. As well as a historic pre-
cursor for digital media, it is suggested that a materialist cinema, represented here by 
the found footage films: Alone: Life Wastes Anrfy Harcfy (Arnold 1998) and Dreamwork 
(Tscherkassky 2001 ), signposts a belated return for materialist film within the con-
text of trauma studies. This materialist turn rescues such experimental film from its 
traumatic excision and extends an understanding of what has been termed a "trau-
ma cinema" by Janet Walker. Rather than pure, abstract or visionary such practice 
is read here through trauma theory as performing implicit mechanisms of denial 
and erasure. It is no wonder that materialist film was avoided in the seventies by a 
feminist project concerned with moving out of the debilitating "victim" positions 
women identified as their lot. In the seventies women had had enough of direct ex-
perience of denial and erasure. The view of "content denied" enables the practice 
of materialist film to speak to the laying bare of the debilitating traumatic flashback 
experience in a way not available to the narrative approach of Wollen's second avant-
garde. To further legitimize materialist film's link to trauma, correspondences are 
drawn between Wollen's two strands of implicit and explicit film-making practices 
and Brewin's neurological research into trauma which clarifies the interaction be-
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tween two parallel memory systems; one implicit (Situational Accessible Memory) 
the other explicit (Verbally Accessible Memory). 
Historical Background 
The history of artists working with the moving image forms a significant dialogue 
with technology that has been variously described as an experimental, avant-garde or 
non-narrative or more specifically, as a formalist or materialist practice. (The more 
specific term "materialist film", that has evolved through Peter Gidal's practice and 
theoretical writing (Gidal 1989) will be the favored term used in this chapter.) John 
Hanhardt suggests the pre-reflective or non-narrative space has been a traditional 
area of interest for avant-garde film: "The avant-garde continues to explore the phys-
ical properties of film and the nature of perceptual transactions which take place be-
tween viewer and film" (Hanhardt 1976: 44). Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenol-
ogy's perceptual emphasis is particularly suited to frame and describe this materialist 
practice: "a movie is not a thought; it is perceived" (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 54). 
As one of its practitioners and theorists, Malcolm Le Grice points out that 1970s 
materialist film's "action on the automatic nervous system seeks to create a nervous 
response which is largely preconscious" (Le Grice 1977: 1 06). Such interest corre-
sponds to the primacy Merleau-Panty assigns to perceptual processes and that pre-
reflective space before thinking occurs. The implicit register of this work is linked to 
recent neurological research into the effects of overwhelming experience on memo-
ry processing as discussed later in the body of this text. 
The specific area of found and stolen images and their re-processing within such 
an experimental practice can be experienced as transforming the originating mater-
ial and emphasizing aspects previously hidden. According to William C. Wees such 
avant-garde found-footage films "are intended to 'undo', deconstruct, or 'detourn' 
images produced and disseminated by the corporate media" (Wees 2002: 4). Such 
an intervention empowers a marginalized and impoverished practice to work with 
images produced by a commercial film and television apparatus to which it has no 
economic access, but to which its practitioners are nevertheless subjected to in daily 
life. Such a "detournement" performed on historic material is examined in the recent 
film work of Peter Tscherkassky, Dreamwork (Austria 11 minutes 2001 ), and Martin 
Arnold's Alone: Ltfe Wastes Antjy Hartjy (Austria 15 minutes 1998). 
Alone: Ltfe Wastes Antjy Harcfy reprocesses sequences from the Antjy Hartjy series 
of black and white features (1937-58). This series, designed for mass consumption 
by a general audience, reflected back family values and family life to nineteen forties 
and fifties Middle America. In 1939, 1940 and 1941 this MGM series made Mickey 
Rooney the most popular Hollywood star despite its comparatively low budget and 
low-brow register. The series charted Andy Hardy's growing up years through child-
hood and adolescence. Judy Garland starred in three of these films as Andy's love 
interest. Tales of small town morality are resolved with man-to-man discussion be-
tween Andy and father Judge Hardy. The films pioneered a formula that later became 
the staple of general television viewing. Arnold samples this resource and focuses in 
on perceived ideological cracks in this material. 
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The second film to be considered, Dreamwork, re-edits sections of the nineteen 
eighties horror color feature film, The Enti!J directed by Sydney J. Furiein (1982), 
whose title sequence asserts that its story is based on real events. The Enti!J follows 
the drama of a woman (played by Barbara Hershey), a single mother, who is raped by 
an invisible assailant and is not believed. The assailant is later identified as the devil. 
In her struggle to be believed Hershey's character comes into contact with a cluster 
of skeptical psychiatrists who dismiss her as a hysteric plagued by her "single" status. 
There is also a group of ghost-busters who try to set an elaborate but misguided trap 
for the entity. Dreamwork is Peter Tscherkassky's compacted re-configuration of Her-
shey's relationship to a home environment saturated with para-normal activity and 
a recurring rape experience. By re-editing and layering shots and parts of imagery 
from the film over the top of each other he creates a complexity that overwhelms 
and challenges the viewer. In both Dreamwork and Alone narrative is fractured to 
uncover the hidden from within the originating Hollywood melodrama. Each film is 
examined in turn in relation to trauma and placed in a larger historical and cultural 
context. 
Alone 
Martin Arnold identifies his practice as one of revealing the suppressed: 
In the symptom, the repressed declares itself. Hollywood cinema is, as I have 
already said, a cinema of exclusion, denial, and repression. I inscribed a symp-
tom into it, which brings some of the aspects of repression onto the surface, 
or to say it in more modest words, which gives an idea of how, behind the 
intact world of being represented, another not-at-all intact world is lurking. 
Maybe this is my revenge on film history. (MacDonald 1994: 11) 
In Alone Arnold repeats obsessively sampled extracts and gestures from the Andy 
Hardy series of films. Arnold's repetitions are sometimes as little as a couple of 
frames long, turning the actors into tic-riddled puppets with accompanying stuttering 
soundtracks reminiscent of scratch video and other sampling strategies employed in 
contemporary experimental music. Judy Garland's song, in its repetitions and loop-
ing movements, unearths new meanings and moves the performance from the lyrical 
into the fragmentation of concrete poetry. Through similar technical manipulations 
a Rooney and Garland kiss is transformed into a long and tentative primal grimace. 
Similar sexual innuendo is unsettlingly teased out of a kitchen scene between Hardy 
(Rooney) and his mother as they rub up against each other ad infinitum while wash-
ing and drying the dishes. 
The back and forth scrubbing of gesture evident here is not comedic, but hones in 
on a melancholic moment of fracture in the gesture itself. It is through such fissures 
that the hidden obsessions of the characters emerge to be inscribed or re-inscribed 
into this obsessively stretched out, repetitive performance of selected sequences 
from the film. The archaic technique of the cut becomes the film's central character. 
Though its directness and as a trace of the amusement parlor of pre-cinema and a 
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cinema of attractions where "an attraction" aggressively subjects the spectator to 
"sensual or psychological impact" (Gunning 1990: 59), Arnold's hyper-editing un-
leashes a psychoanalytic joyride inside a phenomenological framework. 
Arnold has stated his interest in this obsessive repetition as a way to bring back or 
reveal hidden elements. These repetitions perform as tics and stutters in the film. In 
Arnold's psychoanalytic reading, a tic moves over, works against an opposing move-
ment at the visceral level of the body itself, in stuttering "a message that is in conflict 
with what is being said wants to be expressed" (Arnold in MacDonald 1998: 362). 
For Deleuze stuttering "puts language in perpetual disequilibrium" (Deleuze 1998: 
111). As well as stigma and anxiety, stutterers tend to have "greater emotional reac-
tions and more problems with flexibly controlling attention and emotion" (Prasse 
and Kikano 2008: 1272). Tics and stutters offer rich sites of ambiguity, conflict and 
multiple meanings. Through such breakdowns of expression the body performs the 
unspeakable. Through such repetitions, tics and stutters, Alone can be read as the 
baring of an unspoken trauma resiliently embedded under consciousness, endlessly 
replaying as some undecipherable situation. Arnold's technique is about the obses-
sive location, repetition and making visible such scarring moments. 
As a filmic field of a thousand cuts this trauma is read productively as a societal 
trauma rather than a personal or individual one. I<irby Farrell suggests that the "con-
tagiousness" of personal traumas can lead to a general social impact "when partic-
ular social conditions and historical pressures intersect" (Farrell1998: 12). It is such 
a trajectory from the self to the social that Maggie Humm identifies for feminism in 
screen studies in the seventies when she points out that "understanding the personal 
as political - how identity is constructed and represented - is the task of feminist 
theory" (Humm 1997: 179). It is this discursive formation that in recent times has 
accommodated trauma theory within its discourse, initially through the work of 
Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub and Cathy Caruth (Radstone 2001: 188). 
Caruth's view on repetition offers some insight on the perceptual operation of 
Alone. The flashback repeatedly returns trauma's suffering. In normal processing 
of an event, the instant of "seeing" becomes "knowing"; yet in trauma this instant 
is seen but remains unknown, returning over time repeatedly to an unknown or 
"unspeakable" gap. These repetitions suggest "a larger relation to the event which 
extends beyond what can simply be seen or what can be known and is inextricably 
tied up with the belatedness and incomprehensibility that remain at the heart of this 
repetitive seeing" (Caruth 1997: 208). 
Correspondences can be drawn between Arnold's found-footage practice, the 
1970s feminist use of textual analysis and their shared mobilization of psychoa-
nalysis. For one, Arnold trained in psychoanalysis at its Viennese source. In his film 
practice he translates into visual and performative form the strategy of textual analy-
sis developed via feminism in screen studies. Generally textual analysis operates 
to expose the unconscious or repressed through identified fissures in the smooth 
operation of a particular ideology. As Annette Kuhn points out, within feminism it 
was used to uncover the work of patriarchal ideologies in mainstream cinema and 
show that "such disjunctures are discernible within the text in the form of 'symp-
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toms' - cracks, ruptures and so on. These symptoms provide us with clues as to 
what, ideologically speaking, is going on" (Kuhn 1982: 86). Arnold has described his 
practice in constructing Alone in very similar terms at the beginning of this section. 
Within screen studies, such a psychoanalytically grounded textual analysis arose in 
the nineteen seventies out of an appropriation of French critical theory that includ-
ed Lacanian psychoanalysis. As one of the initiators of this tactic Laura Mulvey 
stated that "psychoanalytic theory is thus appropriated here as a political weapon, 
demonstrating the way the unconscious of patriarchal society has structured film 
form" (Mulvey 197 5: 6). 
Textual analysis's migration and metamorphosis from written into visual and per-
formative form re-emphasizes the pre-reflective moment. Alone, in its tics and stut-
ters continually and obsessively returns to the immediacy of the perceptual event 
from which its analysis is read. As viewers we seem to be in the same immediate 
space in which the critic or theorist (or the artist) is sitting in front of the film-editing 
machine. In this moment and space of genesis, the critic is actively stopping and 
starting the film, re-inspecting frames and sequences, creatively grazing. He or she is 
at the point of constructing critical understandings on the film being "analyzed". 
We have moved from one way of thinking to another. Merleau-Ponty's phenom-
enology's ability to theorize and describe this pre-reflective realm of perception ac-
curately recognizes this space: 
My field of perception is constantly filled with a play of colors, noises and 
fleeting tactile sensations which I cannot relate precisely to the context of my 
clearly perceived world, yet which I immediately place in the world, without 
ever confusing them with my daydreams. Equally constantly I weave dreams 
around things. (Merleau-Ponty 1962: x) 
This view produces insights unavailable to psychoanalysis. The viewing experience is 
one in which the repeated performance of these cracks and ruptures impact directly 
as a pre-reflective stun. Does not such a stun itself produce anxiety, fear and deliver 
back the trauma rather than the memory? There is an unresolved tension between a 
re-constitution and a stun or stutter. What comes back in this break? How easy is it 
to think, to negotiate when you have just been "stunned"? Analysis comes after. 
Dreamwork 
Tscherkassky's title of Dreamwork references the psychoanalytic method. Like Freud's 
Interpretation of Dreams (Freud 1971/1900), Peter Tscherkassky articulates his tech-
nique as unearthing something underneath narrative: 
It's like digging. You have something like a landscape, and you know that there 
is something covered, and you dig it out- in that sense 'archaeologist'. It's not 
primarily about ideology, but you have that sense of uncovering new meanings. 
(Blumlinger 2002: 25) 
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As well as this digging into this material, Tscherkassky's film moves beyond Alone 
by charging a new visual complexity into the original material. The multi-layered 
imagery of Dreamwork suggests Merleau-Ponty's world of colors, noises and fleet-
ing tactile sensations. Having identified ''Arnold's" fissures and cuts in the narrative, 
Tscherkassky layers these sequences on top of each other, creating a compact multi-
layered field of movement and re-presentation. We see images of a room, a window, 
Hershey's face and body, we glimpse snatches of movement, see strips of film and 
other textured artifacts (rayograms of nails and grains of sand) often as afterimage, 
flickering and in negative and all at the same time. This layering suggests that the film 
and its narrative content is being materially shattered before us. 
Through his technique of "manufracture", "contact printing and the simultane-
ous manipulation of the elements" (Horwarth 2005: 44), the scene of the rape is 
re-directed back into the audience's face. The aesthetic cacopho?-y of multiple mean-
ings being presented concurrently or simultaneously mirrors the psychic disorder of 
the rape experience. This is a strategy of construction that recreates the force of the 
originating event directly and imparts a sense of overwhelming trauma. Given the 
nature of the originating material, Felman and Laub's approach to trauma as artic~­
lating an "an event without a witness" (Felman and Laub 1992: 75) is pertinent here. 
Is what is presented here a compact narrative of dreams as the title suggests? As 
with Alone, it can indicate a trace of something more immediate. This is not an imag-
ined rape that is being communicated but something more real, direct and immersive. 
It is more about the "here and now" than the processing of dreams. Dreamwork can be 
read as a perceptual performance that re-enacts the rape directly by bringing us back 
to the pre-reflective cacophonous moment of its initiating, implicit bodily impact. 
In describing his strategy of folding the narrative back on itself Tscherkassky ap-
propriates Maya Deren's concepts of vertical and horizontal editing: 
What I really try to do is convert the horizontal structure of a narrative film 
into a vertical structure. This was something that Maya Deren pointed out ... 
well if you take the narrative structure of prose, you have the story unfolding 
on a horizontal line. And you have poetry, where you may have, within every 
single word, several multiple meanings, in terms of connotations. (Blumlinger 
2002: 26) 
Deren uses the horizontal structure of a film to refer to its linear cause and effect 
progress, its narrative or story. But she is also acutely aware that an event can be read 
in multiple ways, has various levels of meaning so that an event can be returned tore-
peatedly to reveal these layers. This Deren describes as an event's vertical structure: 
The poetic construct arises from the fact, if you will, that it is a 'vertical' inves-
tigation of a situation, in that it probes the ramification of a moment, and is 
concerned with its qualities and its depth, so that you have poetry concerned, 
in a sense, not with what is occurring with what it feels like or what it means. 
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A poem, to my mind, creates visible or auditory forms for something that is 
invisible, which is the feeling, or the emotion, or the metaphysical content of 
the movement. (Sitney 1970: 173-4) 
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Deren demonstrated and applied such a relationship between the vertical and the 
horizontal in her Meshes r!f the Afternoon (Deren 1943, USA, 15 minutes). Through its 
similarities Dreamwork can be viewed as a contemporary response to Meshes. Stated 
very simply, Meshes shows a woman entering and moving through her flat. This situa-
tion is serially re-iterated from different points of view. These views are represented 
by her multiple selves that finally appear together onscreen. Meshes has been read as 
unpacking the traumatic thinking and dissociation of a suicide. Kaplan observes that 
Deren's film: 
Produces a visual correlative to the subjective, emotional and visual expe-
rience of trauma, leaving the situation uncertain and to be deduced by the 
viewer. That is, the entire world of the film is 'inside' the traumatic experience. 
(Kaplan 2005: 125) 
The physical difference between Tscherkassky and Deren is that Deren places her 
multiple readings of the one horizontal or linear event in serjes, one after the other, 
whereas Tscherkassky gives them to you overwhelmingly compacted and layered, 
all at once, as a complex field of moving images. The experience of the vertically 
charged moment for the viewer is "here and now" and has to be graphically unrav-
eled. In Dreamwork is as if the pre-reflective moment of, in this case, the rape is re-
constituted re-assembled like a raw flashback that is experienced as REAL. 
From a neurological perspective the traumatic flashback takes "the form of rela-
tively brief sensory impressions such as images, sounds, tastes or smells which are 
accompanied by the original emotions that the individual experienced at the time of 
the event" (I<leim, Wallott and Ehlers 2008: 222). Through this compartmentalized, 
fragmented nature, traumatic memories are implicit, unspeakable. "In some people 
the memories of trauma may have no verbal (explicit) component at all; the memory 
may be entirely organized on an implicit or perceptual level, without an accompany-
ing narrative about what happened" (VanderKolk 1997: 255). 
Maureen Turim makes the connection between the flashback in film and trauma. 
She notes that in melodrama the cinematic flashback breaks settled narrative to mark 
the visceral and unexpected return to the senses of a significant or traumatic experi-
ence. She identifies twenties European avant-garde films as instrumental in develop-
ing its form: "similar abrupt flashbacks mark 1920s avant-garde films" (Turim 2001: 
207). These are the same films claimed by experimental film-makers as initiators of 
a non-narrative tradition (Michelson 1978: 175-6). In Dreamwork Tscherkassky pays 
particular homage to twenties avant-gardist Man Ray, whose Dadaist work Retour d fa 
Raison (1923) is considered an important contribution to this cinematic form "which 
can function essentially on the psychophysical rather than the psycho-interpretive 
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level" (Le Grice 1977: 106). Tscherkassky explains: "I added some of Ray's more 
famous objects- needles, tacks and coarse salt- to my found material and interpreted 
these objects as sexual metaphors within the framework of the plot of the film" 
(Tscherkassky in Horwarth and Loebenstein 2005: 158). 
Neurology 
Deren's concept of vertical and horizontal editing and Tscherkassky's use of it are 
ways of thinking about the relationship between implicit and explicit memory systems 
that predicts recently developed models of memory processing. Recent neurological 
research summarized by Bessel van der Kolk (VanderKolk, McFarlane and Weisaeth 
1996) into the processing of trauma, dissociation and the flashback throws some 
light on the nature of these interactions. He points out that Pierre Janet, working 
with the victims of shell shock in the late 1800s showed that such shock or trauma 
is precipitated by severe emotional responses and that such responses effect how 
memories are stored in a fragmentary manner: "Intense emotions, Janet thought, 
cause memories of particular events to be dissociated from consciousness, and to be 
stored, instead as visceral sensations (anxiety and panic), or as visual images (night-
mares and flashbacks)" (VanderKolk 1996a: 214). 
Brewin Dalgleish and Joseph's (1996) clinical research into memory processes in 
post-traumatic stress proposes a dual processing model in which there is a dialogue 
between two memory systems - verbally accessible memory (V AM) and situation-
ally accessible memory (SAM) - to help explain such traumatic responses. Verbally 
accessible memory (VAM), also referred to as declarative memory (Squire and Zola-
Morgan 1991, Van der Kolk 1996a: 285) involves the "encoding and Storage of 
conscious experience" (Brewin 2001: 161). Verbally based, VAM enables narrative 
with retrieval upon request. Because it is linear and consequential in assembly its 
process speed is limited. This has the same effect as the impact of low bandwidth 
in computer technology. V AM exhibits a strong sense of time. The hippocampus is 
involved in the formation of conscious memories, of building up a unified "cogni-
tive map" (Van der Kolk 1996b: 295) that allows flexible access to these memories. 
These neurological structures enable objective or reflective thinking. 
"Situationally accessible memory'' (SAM) or implicit memory allows no retrieval 
upon request and displays no sense of time. You do not have "at call" access to 
your own stored experiences. It is the situation that triggers the memory that is 
re-experienced rather than recalled. This describes the unexpected flashback trig-
gered by external cues or thoughts in traumatized individuals. SAM is "unable to 
encode spatial and temporal context" (Brewin 2001: 161). It focuses narrowly on 
risk and is detail rich. According to Hellawell and Brewin (2004), SAM consists of 
"the exclusive automated mode of retrieval, the high level of perceptual detail, and 
the distortion of subjective time, such as the event is experienced in the present." 
(Hellawell and Brewin 2004: 3) This memory system is aligned with Merleau-Ponty's 
notion of the pre-reflective and with subjective experience before thinking. These 
memories are processed through an older part of the brain known as the amygdala. 
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The amygdala's functions are not flexible and are concerned with attaching affect to 
incoming cues and the "establishment of associations between sensory stimuli" (Van 
der Kolk 1996a: 230). 
How do "samming" and "vamming" interact when these two systems are oper-
ating normally in parallel to each other? When you have a conversation, for exam-
ple, or travel from A to B, information is laid down in both memory systems. You 
may recall or explain what you have done and seen (vamming) but there are certain 
gestures, impressions that somehow do not fit in and are not part of the recount-
ing. Such moments may come back to you uneasily or unexpectedly (samming) and 
belatedly. These flashbacks may pre-occupy you. You may talk to someone about 
them until, somehow, you re-work or reconsider these impressions, integrating them 
into a cohesive "story" with the events already understood. In this way visual replay 
(flashback) is rehearsed and then inserted into narrative, moving from the SAM to 
the VAM memory system. 
Metcalfe and Jacobs (1998) have identified that high levels of arousal (trauma) 
breaks down hippocampus functioning and inhibits vamming so that, when the situ-
ational memory returns there no narrative for this flashback to be inserted into. Like 
a broken record it has nowhere to go and is destined to try again later. Rich in detail 
with no temporal context, such "affect fragments" periodically redial into a network 
that was never built and jolt the receiver as if they are happening right now. 
This model can describe how Dreamwork, for example, as a "pre-narrative" film 
can be experienced with its immediate narrative context stripped away. It is in the 
shock of the perceptually rich performances, in their immediacy and directness that 
the film is encountered (or more accurately perceived) in samming mode. The film 
has been constructed by working backwards, folding back to the pre-reflective mo-
ment. In Tscherkassky's technique of construction its integrated vamming (explicit) 
memory is broken down into its high definition samming (implicit) fragments. The 
perceptual and making sense process of being in the world is retraced back to the 
pre-reflective perceptual moment of "first contact". We experience this moment of 
first contact with an overwhelming immediacy. 
This relationship between vamming and samming also re-calls the relationship be-
tween verbal and visual thinking. Brewin's model is also a much more systemic and 
dynamic model than the left brain/ right brain oppositions that Small (1994: 6) em-
ploys in his argument in Direct theory. Here Small argues that the visual reflexivity 
that occurs in experimental film as a form of theorizing with a right brain emphasis. 
It is also more developed than the old brain/ new brain dichotomy used by Len Lye 
to talk about his "doodling" film work as old brain work (Horrocks 1979: 33). As 
previously emphasized, Maya Deren's thinking on vertical and horizontal editing also 
resembles Brewin's dichotomy. The body-centered samming and the cortex-centered 
vamming can also be applied to the perennial mind-body split present within West-
ern culture. Traumatic experience itself in fact has been conceptualized as an ex-
treme mind-body dissociation. 
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The Two Avant-Gardes 
Peter Wollen's influential article "The Two Avant -gardes" (Wollen 1982), first pub-
lished in Studio International in 197 5, places the avant -garde into two camps that 
uncannily resemble the two memory systems that Brewin's Dual processing mod-
el identifies as SA.i\1[ and VAM. Wollen's dichotomy is performed at the point of 
emergence of feminist film practice and its critical textual analysis of dominant cin-
ema. Partner and film collaborator Laura Mulvey's influential feminist text on male 
scopophilia in cinema also performed an initiating function in these developments. 
At this stage Wollen and Mulvey had already collaborated on Penthesziea (1974), which 
according to Al Rees "attempts to construct feminist discourses in a triangulation of 
Marxism, semiotics and psychoanalysis" (Rees 1999: 91). 
Wollen's text splits the avant-garde in two. The first comprises non-narrative and 
formalist (materialist) work residing in the multi-voices and collective emphasis of the 
artisanal "co-op movement" that emerged out of the fine arts (painting, sculpture) 
and the second embodied a more politicized narrative practice employing psychoana-
lytic and Marxist ideologies in its analysis, with a relation to literary criticism, theatre 
and the margins of commercial cinema. One focuses on vision, perceptual processes 
and the image and the other emphasizes the social implications of the text and lan-
guage. 
Wollen observes that a similar split can be seen in the twenties between the Cubist 
influenced cinema of Leger, Richter and Man Ray to extend the scope of paint-
ing and a Russian avant-garde in which Wollen includes, Eisenstein, Dovhenko and 
Vertov (Wollen 1982: 24). This Cubist cinema identifies those same films that Turim 
suggests display the characteristics of the flashback in melodrama and contains the 
work of Tscherkassky's exemplar, Man Ray. 
Interestingly, the contrast in qualities between Wollen's two avant-gardes, the visual 
and visceral, direct impact nature of materialist film and the referential, intertextual, 
verbal and narrative emphasis of avant-garde's political arm match the implicit and 
explicit qualities of SAM and VAM in Brewin's dual processing model developed 
though neurological research of traumatic experience. 
Wollen identifies the work of Jean-Luc Godard as the contemporary exemplar of 
the political arm of this avant-garde. Through semiotics, he describes this political 
avant-garde as focusing its "work within the space opened up by the disjunction and 
dislocation of signifier and signified" (Wollen 1982: 98). There is a dismissive tone 
for those working in the materialist arm of the first avant-garde: "it is as if they felt 
that once the signifier was freed from bondage to the signified, it was certain to 
celebrate by doing away with the old master altogether in a fit of irresponsible ultra-
leftism and utopianism. As we have seen, this was not so far wrong" (Wollen 1982: 
99). Though there is an appearance of evenhandedness, clearly Wollen prefers the 
second avant-garde in which his collaborative practice with Mulvey is placed. 
Wollen's criticism of ultra-leftism and utopianism may well have been directed at 
his contemporaries Malcolm Le Grice and Peter Gidal. Gidal's didactic texts in favor 
of materialist film were placed at a further extreme end of any negation of the status 
quo than any feminist counter-cinema: "Without a theory and practice of radically 
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materialist experimental film, cinema would endlessly be the 'natural' reproduction 
of capitalist and patriarchal forms" (Gidal 1989: xiii). Gidal identifies materialist 
film as influenced by abstract expressionism and minimalism and stresses a post-
Warholian stance so that "to intervene crucially in film practice, the un-thought must 
be brought to knowledge, thought" (Gidal1976: 15). For Rees the breaking point 
between these two camps rested upon "the issue of narrative, realism and represen-
tation, which Screen analyzed critically but which the avant-garde rejected as primary 
goals for film" (Rees 1999: 93). 
Rather than utopianism, the freedom of form from content that Wollen identi-
fies, can today also be read through trauma as "content denied", as an erasure, or 
the signified's absolute gutting. A viewer could receive a materialist film as a trauma 
inducing dissociative experience. This is the belated rejoinder that both Alone and 
Dreamwork make to this debate from thirty years earlier. Caruth has underlined the 
importance the belatedness in the experiencing of trauma that not only informs the 
thirty-year gap in materialist film's response, but also the unknowability of the expe-
riences addressed in these films at the heart of Wollen's dismissal: 
Traumatic experience, beyond the psychological dimensions of suffering it in-
volves, suggests a certain paradox: that the most direct way of seeing of a 
violent event may occur as an absolute inability to know it, that immediacy, 
paradoxically may take the form of belatedness. (Caruth 1995: 6) 
From this new perspective, rather than utopianism materialist film re-performs the 
trauma of overwhelming experience for the viewer both historically and experientially. 
The critical splitting made visible through Wollen's text was a decisive strategic 
move that sets up a space from which a critically and politically aware feminist 
counter-cinema can be asserted. As argued by Wollen's then partner and collabora-
tor Laura Mulvey: 
Women cannot be satisfied with an aesthetic that restricts counter-cinema to 
work on form alone. Feminism is bound to its politics; its experimentation can-
not exclude work on content, and it has, in this way, more in common with the 
avant-garde tradition that has tried to radicalise the signifier. (Mulvey 1979: 9) 
Constance Penley's critical textual analysis of the writings of Le Grice (1977) and 
Gidal (1989, 197 6) on structuralist/ materialist film in the Imaginary and the Avant-garde 
(Penley 1977) enacts this split by operating on materialist film with the same scal-
pel of psychoanalytic theory mobilized to unpack melodrama. A closer look at her 
arguments there are productive when re-examined within the emergence of trauma 
theory, the digital media explosion and the speed-up of information flow associated 
with it. Penley argues that in avant-'garde film there is an overemphasis on the techni-
cal and as a predominantly male, "narcissistic" enterprise using a politically ineffec-
tive language devoid of fantasy and desire. She enlists Metz's understanding of film 
viewing as an "authorised scopophilia, legalized voyeurism" (Penley 1977: 13) against 
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films that are "presented as near scientific investigations of scientific process" and 
reads this latter position as containing a tendency "to suppress a knowledge of the 
imaginary'' (Penley 1977: 13). 
After her marking of materialist-structural film as "fetishist impasse", Penley re-
veals her own preference for a political avant-garde, in line with Wollen, as the pre-
ferred response for the "current" socio-historic situation for a feminist cinema. She 
observes that: 
The films of Godard have consistently taken into account this work of lan-
guage on image, as have those of Straub-Huillet, and Mulvey and Wollen. 
These film-makers realize that images have very little analytic power in them-
selves because their effects of fascination and identification are too strong. 
This is why there must always be a commentary on the images simultaneously 
with the commentary of and with them. (Penley 1977: 24) 
Penley is not concerned with the "advanced solutions to formal problems" (Penley 
1977: 25) or "perceptual processes" (Penley 1977: 8) identified in materialist film 
but about working at the limits of narrative and fiction that she finds in the works 
of Chantal Akerman, Marguerite Duras, Yvonne Rainer and Babette Mangolte, that 
same area of feminist practice more recently identified by Kaplan (2001, 2005) and 
Walker (2005) twenty years on, as fertile for articulating aspects of traumatic expe-
rience under the banner of "trauma cinema". Such a "trauma cinema" includes at 
its vanguard that same group of films that Penley identified. Of these examples of 
trauma cinema Walker observes that: 
These films are characterised by non-linearity, fragmentation, non-synchronous 
sound, repetition, rapid editing and strange angles. And they approach the past 
through an unusual admixture of emotional affect, metonymic symbolism and 
cinematic flashbacks. (\Xlalker 2001: 214) 
Kaplan similarly identifies those "independent cinematic techniques (that) show 
paralysis, repetition, circularity- all aspects of the non-representability of trauma and 
yet of the search to figure its pain'.' (Kaplan and Wang 2004: 204). 
Commenting at the time on the tenor of the face-off between these two avant-
gardes, Turim has observed that in terms of abstract film "the avant-garde has been 
engaged in a rhetorical arsenal aimed at granting or denying these films power as 
tools or weapons in an ideological struggle" (Turim 1980: 144). In this seventies pe-
riod, we may well be at that cultural moment when the "resistance" politics of May 
68 is being domesticated to move off the streets back into theory and the academy. 
The time had come to transform banner slogans like "the technological is political", 
"less is more" and "the personal is political" back into cultural capital. This is a con-
tested space of academic careers, of prominence and priorities which leaves Turim 
to wonder: "How many critical tautologies can be set up which circumscribe with 
their own assumptions their own conclusions" (Turim 1980: 144). 
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The New Situation 
Read through the contemporary prism of "trauma theory" and Brewin's neurolog-
ical model Penley's criticisms of Gidal and Le Grice's writings on materialist film 
read like the deficiencies that define implicit memory (SAM) through its graphic 
int~nsity, immediacy and lack of story or context. Penley could just as easily be de-
scribing situation~lly accessible memory (SAM) in noting: "the first tactic of struc-
turalist/ materialist film is the emptying from the cinematic signifier of all semantic, 
associative, symbolic, representational significance" (Penley 1977: 8). This is what 
trauma does to memory. Mulvey's description of Gidal's strategy of "rejecting all 
content and narrative" (Mulvey 1979: 9) articulates Laub and Auerhahn's trauma's 
"not knowing"(Laub & Auerhahn 1993: 290). 
Nor do Gidal or Le Grice situate or understand their seventies anti-illusionist ma-
terialist practice in any relation to trauma or VAM. Yet this practice, as Penley's crit-
icisms suggest, may be read productively today through trauma as "content denied" 
and as making evident the mechanics of erasure at the heart of traumatic experience 
rather than a sublimely radical position that frames cognition and the apparatus of 
film as its intrinsic de-facto subject. There is a trace of a traumatic view discernible 
in the practices of abstract expressionism and minimalism available to support this 
view, given that Gidal sourced these New York art movements in developing his 
arguments for materialist film. Guilbaut has made this point: "avant-garde art be-
came an art of obliteration, an act of erasure" (Guilbaut 1983). With reference to 
Frank Stella's minimalist black paintings with such Nazi invoking titles as Die Fahne 
Roehl, Reichstag and Arbeit Macht Frei, Anna Chave suggests that "minimalism gen-
erally, might well be described as perpetrating a kind of cultural terrorism, forcing 
the viewer into the role of victim" (Chave 1990: 49). I am also reminded of Robert 
Rauschenberg's erasure of a Willem de Kooning drawing gifted to Rauschenberg in 
his "Erased de Kooning Drawing' (1953) over one month with forty erasers (Solomon, 
1997: 238). Gidal's "un-thought" (Gidal 1976: 15) describes trauma. His descrip-
tion of his self-reflexive practice as "a filmic practice in which one watches oneself 
watching" (Gidal 197 6: 1 0) brings to mind dissociation's out -of-body experience. By 
Le Grice placing the "flux of perception" (Le Grice 1977: 10) at his practice's core, 
he focuses on the pre-conscious realm of the traumatic flashback experience. 
Alone and Dreamwork mark a return of the first avant-garde to critical scrutiny 
within the context of trauma, a scrutiny not only dismissed by Penley but also Mulvey 
and Wollen. Neither did its proponents envision this return or predict its new shape. 
It comes back by transforming the method of textual analysis used to discount its 
political relevance into a performative visual and perceptual practice. 
Thomas Elsaesser utilizes trauma theory in screen studies to suggest that a gener-
al traumatizing has occurred of "the moving image in our culture as the symptom 
without a cause, as the event without a trace" (Elsaesser 2001: 197). Vilem Flusser 
identifies this as a world of "technical images" pre-occupied with surface and a new 
inherent magic not penetrable by those linear forms of critical thinking available 
through a written text. This world of magic is a 
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World in which everything is repeated and in which everything participates in 
a significant context. Such a world is structurally different from a linear world 
of history in which nothing is repeated and in which everything has causes and 
will have consequences. (Flusser 2000: 9) 
Prensky suggests that, with young people today, their "thinking patterns have 
changed" through the impact of digital technology on their daily lives. They "think 
and process information fundamentally differently" (Prensky 2001: 1). Digital Na-
tives are used to receiving information really fast. They like to parallel process and 
multitask. They prefer graphics before their text rather than the opposite. They pre-
fer random access (like hypertext). On the other hand, Digital Immigrants place 
more emphasis on the type of reflection enabled by literate culture. Here again we 
have the V AM and SAM split with an identified shift to SAM like processing. 
Bell our (2001 ), Penley (1977) and Mulvey (2004) have also identified in their more 
recent writing this digitally enabled shift, situating a preferred "pensive spectator" 
for a "fetishistic" one. They point to the computer's desktop manipulation, freezing, 
slowing down and speeding up the moving image as indicators of a more sophisti-
cated and interactive consumption. Mulvey observes that, ''As the spectator controls 
the unfolding of the cinematic image, so the drive of the narrative is weakened and 
other, previously invisible or unimportant details come to the fore" (Mulvey 2004: 
90). Mulvey's "invisible and unimportant details" have always been the subject of 
Gidal's materialist practice. For Bellour this shift marks an end for a textual analysis 
that as early as 1985 in ''Analysis in Flames", Bellour marked as "an art without a 
future" (Bellour 2001: xii), as technological developments allowed a form of textual 
analysis to be performed by the multitudes on the VCR. This has since expanded 
further to home computer use. This is an incisive insight given Bellour's remarks 
about the rise of the critic in the nineteen sixties and his own participation in this rise 
through his practice of textual analysis in such publications as Screen. 
For Bellour there was an important shift in the role of the critic in the nineteen 
sixties, which up to then depended on sitting in the darkened theatre scribbling notes 
with eyes fixed on the screen. In this posture: 
A vertigo and a hysterical trembling remained: the vertigo of not being sure of 
my text, and with it, by the relative impossibility of doing so, a different kind 
of profound vertigo by what the implications would be if I were someday able 
to be sure of it. (Bellour 2001: 3) 
This changed with access to the then new technology of the film editing machine 
(e.g. Steenbeck), and the film analysis projector. The vertigo migrated elsewhere out 
of the body of the critic. The critic could privately stop, start, freeze and replay the 
film outside of its theatrical screening context, creatively transforming the possibili-
ties of cri~cism and analysis. Bellour could be sure of it. 
The connection has previously been made between seventies textual analysis and 
recent found-footage films. When Humm outlines textual analysis she could be de-
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scribing Tscherkassky or Arnold's practice: "By examining condensations, ruptures 
and excess stereotypes in the filmic text, critics aim to reveal a hidden sub-text which 
may structure a film's 'identity"' (Humm 1997: 15). In discussing the film critic 
Bellour's textual analysis, Belton notes its transforming effect: 
Bellour, like all critics, necessarily rewrites the film he is analyzing to reveal or 
make clear its operations. For the original text he substitutes, out of necessi-
ty, his engagement with the text and this becomes the subject of his analysis. 
(Belton 2006: 243) 
This viewer position of replay that emerged for the critic in the sixties and for the 
general public in the eighties resembles the pre-reflective and performative space that 
materialist film presented to the viewer. It is discernible in the found footage work 
of the period, for example, Le Grice's Little Dog For Roger (1967, 12 minutes) and Ber-
lin Horse (1970, nine minutes, one and two screen versions) and, of course, the two 
contemporary films identified here. This realization opens up reading the face-off 
between the two avant-gardes as a contestation over ownership of the production of 
cultural meaning between the artist and the critic. Who owns the space in front of 
the film-editing machine? In the 1970s the critic's claim prevailed. 
With the advent of the digital the situation changes. Alone and Dreamwork perform 
for the viewer those image manipulations that provided the source and re-configura-
tions of Bellour's value adding work. In so doing the critic's position is bypassed and 
perhaps rendered redundant. That the ground has shifted, perhaps even inverted, 
is clear. When Penley asserts that "now we can do research on cinema history and 
theory by quoting images rather than by turning images into language" (Penley in 
Bellour 2001: xili), she displays an unexpected affinity with the materialist position 
she so effectively dismantled thirty years before. Penley's earlier assertion on the ne-
cessity of "a commentary on the images simultaneously with the commentary if and 
with them"' (Penley 1977: 25) reduces in authority. 
The importance of this new prevalent accessibility is also part of Mulvey's reading 
of this new digital multi-platform situation: 
I have tried to evolve a different kind of spectatorship, one driven by curiosity 
and a drive to decipher the images unfolding on the screen. However the curi-
ous spectator was, by and large, the product of feminism, of the avant-garde, 
and of a consciously alternative relation to cinema ... this spectator is the an-
cestor of the one formed by new modes of relating to the screen image now 
immediately accessible to anyone who cares to experiment with the equipment 
available. (Mulvey 2004: 89) 
I begin this summing up with a series of questions. Is Mulvey's pensive spectator 
not that same spectator created by materialist film in the seventies? Is it not its his-
tory that has to be belatedly re-inserted here? Is this not the wound that flashes back 
as a trace in the work of Tscherkassky and Arnold, in their repetitive, cyclical and 
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layered sampling strategies? Do not these technical operations excavate the pre-con-
scious of textual analysis? Although the film text itself may prove an "unattainable 
text" for the critic as Bellour suggested in Screen in 1975 (Bellour 1975) this may not 
be the case the other way around for a new materialism that, in a display of its as-
cendancy, visually lays bare the critic's own practice and recontextualizes the search 
for the sublime in painting and an essential perceptually based film-making practice 
in terms of its shadow; the articulation of the mechanics of denial. Trauma theory 
enables a re-integrating of feminist criticisms made of seventies formalist materialist 
film-making practice, retooling that practice for critically unpacking the digital image 
in an emergent visual culture where, according to Nicholas Mirzoeff, "the world-as-
a-text has been challenged by the world-as-a-picture" (Mirzoeff 1998: 5). 
